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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COU
STATE OF GEORGIA
ETOWAH ENVIRONMENTAL GROUP, LLC,

Plaintiff,
v.
MICHAEL WALSH, CHRISTOPHER BEALL,
ADSTAR WASTE HOLDINGS CORP., and
HIGHSTAR CAPITAL FUND II, L.P.,

Defendants.

MAR 31 ZO'4

)
)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2012-CV-211149

)

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This matter is before the COUli on the Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendants
AdStar Waste Holdings Corp. ("AdStar"), Highstar Capital Fund II, L.P. ("Highstar"), Michael
Walsh ("Walsh"), and Christopher Beall ("Beall," together with AdStar, Highstar, and Walsh,
"Defendants").

Upon consideration of the briefs and materials submitted on the motion, oral

argument of counsel and the record of the case, this Court finds as follows:
Plaintiff and non-party Advanced Disposal Services, Inc. ("ADS") owned Federal Road,
LLC ("Federal Road"), through which they owned and operated the Eagle Point Landfill located
in Forsyth County, Georgia. Plaintiff owned twenty-five percent and ADS owned seventy-five
percent of Federal Road.
In 2006, ADS and Defendants began to discuss the prospect of Defendants' acquisition of
ADS. The Federal Road Operating Agreement provides that Federal Road could be merged into
ADS upon ADS' election, which would then trigger Plaintiff s right to an appraisal of its shares.
Additionally, Plaintiff contends and for purposes of this motion Defendants do not dispute,
Plaintiff could also elect to exercise "tag-along" rights upon a change in control which would

permit Plaintiff to "tag along" to the deal negotiated by ADS upon the same incremental price
and on the same terms and conditions.
Defendants made three offers to purchase ADS in total. On May 5, 2006, Walsh wrote to
ADS and offered to purchase its shares for $425 million with a valuation of Federal Road
between $62 and $65 million. On May 10, 2006, Defendants increased the offer for ADS by $25
million to $450 million, but decreased the value of Federal Road to between $45.5 million and
$47 million.

Finally, on May 19, 2006, Defendants raised the offer for ADS to $470 million

with an allocation of $45.5 million to Federal Road.
On June 13, 2006, ADS officers met with Plaintiff and revealed the $45.5 million offer
for Federal Road. Plaintiff was not told about the $65 million valuation placed on Federal Road
in the first offer letter. At that meeting Plaintiff was given the choice to either tag along at its
proportionate share of the $45.5 million offer or be subject to the appraisal process, which
Plaintiff contends imposed unfavorable rules and limits as required under the Federal Road
Operating Agreement on the method of apportioning value to its shares. Due to its alleged
reliance on the $45.5 million price Plaintiff elected to pursue its appraisal rights which ultimately
led to litigation and then arbitration with ADS over the parties' dispute of the appraisal process.
Plaintiff ultimately received $26.4 million against ADS and one of its principals which included
the value of its interest in Federal Road.
Now, Plaintiff has asserted claims against Defendants based on their alleged conduct in
conspiring with ADS to purposely undervalue Federal Road so the buy-out of Plaintiffs interest
would be cheaper. On August 17, 2012, this Court entered an Order denying Defendants'
motion for summary judgment filed early in the case. Following discovery Defendants then filed
this second motion for summary judgment. Now, afforded the opportunity to review to a more
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complete record while focused on the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the Court has a different
opinion regarding the merits of the case and concludes Plaintiff is precluded from re-litigating
the value of its interest in Federal Road which was already determined by the arbitration panel.
Accordingly, Defendants' motion is GRANTED.

Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, applies where an issue of fact or law is actually
litigated and determined by a valid judgment and the determination is essential to the judgment.
Macon Water Authority v. City of Forsyth, 262 Ga. App. 224 (2003). As with claim preclusion,
or res judicata, issue preclusion requires that: (1) both proceedings must involve the same parties
or their privies; (2) there must have been a decision on the merits; and (3) the party against
whom the doctrine is asserted must have had a full opportunity to litigate the issue in question.
Id. Issue preclusion is not dependent, however, on the two causes of action being the same;
rather, it precludes issues that were actually adjudicated in the prior proceeding, as well as issues
that necessarily had to be decided in order for the previous judgment to have been rendered.
Burnett v. Slatter, 286 Ga. 169 (2009).
In the prior arbitration, the panel crafted its own determination ofthe value of Plaintiffs
interest in Federal Road (rather than applying the appraisal method established under the
Operating Agreement) by determining Federal Road's historical EBITDA for the 12 months
prior to the merger and multiplying that figure by a factor of 9.8, which was based on the
industry average multiple for integrated landfills previously used by Defendants.
Now Plaintiff seeks to recover under a slightly different valuation method which it argues
reflects "tag-along" value. This valuation analysis takes the full amount Defendants paid for
ADS ($470M) and attempts to ascribe value to Federal Road by allocating its proportionate
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amount of that figure. Plaintiff contends the valuation analysis performed by the arbitrators
differs from the "tag-along" value Plaintiff is currently pursuing.
The Court has reconsidered the viability of this distinction.

When the Court first visited

Defendants' dispositive arguments the Court was persuaded, in theory, there could be a gap
between "appraisal" and "tag-along" value. Theoretically, tag-along rights (based on the actual
price achieved by an asset) may be different than appraisal rights (based on a variation of fair
market value). However, the complication in this case is there was no actual purchase plice paid
for Federal Road, which is the metric a tag-along figure is supposed to represent. Instead, the
"tag-along" value of Federal Road must be extracted from the total value of ADS, which
necessarily requires the differing valuation techniques (and the same battle of valuation experts)
akin to any other appraisal valuation.
The COUli finds the arbitration panel fully adjudicated the valuation of Federal Road.
Simply put, because Plaintiff has hired a different expert here, who may be able to concoct
another valuation opinion or ascribe a different multiple to Federal Road's EBITDA value

I , does

110t warrant another day in court. In any event, the COUli is not persuaded Plaintiff's analysis
here, framed by the price actually achieved for ADS, reflects a substantive difference to signify a
separate claim. Accordingly, the Court finds the issue of Plaintiffs interest in Federal Road was
litigated and determined in the arbitration proceeding.
Turning now to the next disputed element of issue preclusion, the Court is satisfied
Defendants were in privy with ADS and Mr. Appleby, defendants in the arbitration proceeding,

1 Plaintiff's
expert merely reverse-engineers a methodology strikingly similar
to that performed by the panel-he just starts with a different ADS asset
(determines historical EBITDA, ascribes a multiple based, in part on
Defendants' past purchase history) to back in to a value he opines should be
afforded to Federal Road based on the ADS purchase price.
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to satisfy this element of Georgia's issue preclusion doctrine. Plaintiff alleges Defendants
conspired with ADS and Appleby to undervalue its interest, and "co-conspirators
to be in privity for purposes of res judicata."

are considered

Brewer v. Schacht, 235 Ga. App. 313, 315 (1998).

Further, Plaintiff had a sufficient opportunity to litigate its loss of "tag-along" rights in the
arbitration panel. All the facts on which the instant claims are now based were known to
Plaintiff prior to the arbitration and Plaintiff made Defendants' conduct known to the panel
which was persuaded to adopt Plaintiffs valuation expert in lieu of the appraisal process set out
in the Operating Agreement.

Plaintiff argued for and won the value of its interest in Federal

Road under the Operating Agreement, including the value of its tag-along rights. For these
reasons the Court finds Plaintiff's claims based on the value of Federal Road barred by collateral
estoppel.
Because Plaintiff has been fully and completely compensated for ADS and Appleby's
breach of fiduciary duty its fraud, aiding and abetting, tortious interference and civil conspiracy
claims fail as they all arise from the actions breaching the Operating Agreement through the
merger of Federal Road into ADS, which claims have been fully adjudicated and satisfied.
As part of its fraud claims, Plaintiff has also accused Defendants of displaying a lack of
candor during the arbitration process by providing misleading or inaccurate testimony and by
withholding documents.

Previously, the Court upheld this claim, finding Georgia law recognizes

such a cause of action in Butler v. Tumer, 274 Ga. 566 (2001).

Defendants now ask the Court to

distinguish this authority on the basis that, unlike Butler, Plaintiff was a party to the arbitration
proceeding allegedly called into question by Defendants' fraud and could therefore pursue other
forms of redress available in that proceeding.
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Defendants' point is well-taken.

Indeed, the Butler court emphasizes the plaintiff "was

not a plaintiff in the [suit at issue], had no control over the litigation, and expressly was not
represented by the [plaintiff in the prior suit]." Butler, at 569. In view of this distinction and
considering the Court of Appeals' later direction in Willet v. Stookey, 256 Ga. App. 403, 411
(2002)2, the Court grants Defendants' motion as to this issue.
Finally, Defendants argue claim preclusion also bars Plaintiffs claim for damages based
on expenses it incurred in the appraisal process and subsequent litigation. In the arbitration
award the panel found it was not appropriate to award Plaintiffs attorneys' fees because, in part,
the Operating Agreement required both parties to bear their own litigation costs. Additionally,
the panel held:
[T]he Panel is concerned about Etowah's delay in attempting to circumvent
arbitration. And if attorneys' fees were awarded, Etowah would have to allocate
the expenses between successful and unsuccessful claims asserted and those
tainted by bad faith and those not, an exercise which we find to be impossible in
this case.
Based on this portion of the award, Defendants argue collateral estoppel attaches to this
portion of the arbitration award to conclusively bar Plaintiffs claim against Defendants for
attorneys' fees.
In its prior Order, the COUli found a distinction between the panel's attorneys' fees
analysis under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11, and the issue currently before the Court-which is whether
Defendants' conduct caused damage to Plaintiff. In so holding, the COUli focused on the
different liability assessments each analysis would require-i.e.,

whether Appleby's conduct

satisfied the threshold under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11 versus whether Defendants' independent
"To the extent that [plaintiff) alleges that [defendant] had procured false
testimony or fabricated documents in anticipation of trial, this amounts to a
claim of conspiracy to commit perjury, or of perjury, for which there is no
civil remedy.n
Willet, 256, Ga. App. at 411.
2
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conduct caused damages, such as Plaintiff having to hire an appraiser and absorb litigation
expenses. Previously, the COUli found such issues distinct for res judicata purposes.
Now, upon second look, the Court finds its focus on liability too narrow. While the
liability assessment undertaken by the arbitration panel may have been different than the issue
here, they nevertheless considered identical damages evidence and found those damages
impossible to appropriately allocate. Because Plaintiffs claims here rise and fall on the same
obligation to establish damages and because the arbitration panel has already squarely
adjudicated the issue of Plaintiffs damages and found it "impossible" to determine, the COUli
finds Plaintiffs claim for damages based on attorneys' fees incurred in the arbitration also barred
by collateral estoppel. Accordingly, Defendants' motion is granted as to this issue.

In light of the Court's ruling on Plaintiffs claim for the "tag-along" value of Federal
Road, Defendants' motion to exclude the report and testimony of Christopher Mercer is moot.
SO ORDERED this 31st day of March, 2014.

~~.~d2--~

~WESTMORELAND,JUDGE
Superior Court of Fulton County
Atlanta Judicial Circuit

Copies to:

Attornevs for Plaintiffs

Attorneys for Defendants

H. Wayne Phears, Esq.
Jack C. Lundstedt, Jr., Esq.
MCGUIRE WOODS, LLP
1230 Peachtree Street, NE
Suite 2100
Atlanta, GA 30309
w:ghears@mcguirewoods.com
jlundstedt@mcguirewoods.com

David L. Balser, Esq.
Lawrence A. Slovensky, Esq.
Kathleen A. Sacks, Esq.
Katherine E. Grayson, Esq.
KING & SPALDING LLP
1180 Peachtree Street N.E.
Atlanta, GA 30309
(404) 572-4600
dbalser@kslaw.com
lslovensky@kslaw.com

David J. Forestner
7
Etowah Environmental Group, LLCv. Walsh, et al.

CAFN 2012CV211149
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

ksacks@kslaw.com
kgra yson@kslaw.com

Carlton Fields, P A
1201 W. Peachtree Street, N.W.
Suite 3000
Atlanta, Georgia 30309
404-815-1706
dfores tner@carltonfields.com

Bruce P. Brown, Esq.
BRUCE P. BROWN LAW LLC
309 N. Highland Ave. NE, Suite A
Atlanta, GA 30307
(404) 584-0400
bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com
Amy R. Foote, Esq.
(admitted pro hac vice)
Irene Ricci, Esq.
FOOTE LAW FIRM
399 Park Avenue
New York, NY 10022
afoote@foote-lawfinn.com
iricci@foote-lawfinn.com
Douglass A. Mitchell
(admitted pro hac vice)
BOIES, SCHILLER & FLEXNER LLP
300 South Fourth Street, Suite 800
Las Vegas, NV 89101
(702) 382-7300
dmitchell@bsfllp.com

8
Etowah Environmental Group, LLC v. Walsh, et al.

CAFN 2012CV211149
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS'

SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

